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Abstract—Cloud computing has become the prominent 
technology of this era. Its elasticity, dynamicity, availability, 
heterogeneity, and pay as you go pricing model has attracted 
several companies to migrate their businesses’ services into the 
cloud. This gives them more time to focus solely on their businesses 
and reduces the management and backup overhead leveraging the 
flexibility of cloud computing. On the other hand, quantum 
technology is developing very rapidly. Experts are expecting to get 
an efficient quantum computer within the next decade. This has a 
significant impact on several sciences including cryptography, 
medical research, and other fields. This paper analyses the 
reciprocal impact of quantum technology on cloud computing and 
vice versa. 
Keywords—Cloud Computing, Quantum Computing, Post-
Quantum Cryptography, Quantum Resistant TPM, Quantum Driven 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is a popular thought that a quantum computer is a set 
of classical computers working in parallel to process all of the 
possible states at once and then ends up with the correct answer. 
And that once an efficient quantum computer comes into 
existence, we can solve all of the problems that we have in no 
time and there will be no need for any classical super computer 
where we used to submit our extensive computational problems. 
However, unfortunately, this is not true. A quantum computer 
does not process all of the possible states at once, rather it is in 
a superposition state of all possible classical states, i.e., a kind 
of combination of all classical states with a probability 
associated with each one based on the problem being solved. So, 
it does not process all the states individually, rather it tries to 
find an underlying structure to these states that can be utilized 
to amplify the probability of the state with the correct answer 
giving it more chance to be selected at the end [1]. In fact, all of 
the NP-complete problems are believed to be outside BQP, i.e., 
the problems that can be solved by a quantum computer in 
polynomial time, as illustrated in Fig. 1. 
Consequently, there is no proof that a quantum computer can 
be exponentially more efficient than any classical computer for 
solving any problem. It is currently true for some problems, e.g., 
factoring a large number, because there is no known efficient 
algorithm to solve them using a classical computer. However, 
there is no proof that such an algorithm does not exist. In fact, 
factorization is not yet proven to be an NP-compete problem. 
This means that it is not very unlikely that somebody will be 
able to come up with a polynomial factoring algorithm breaking 
out all of the current security in use even before a quantum 
computer exists. For instance, people have long believed that 
there is no efficient algorithm for primality-testing, an algorithm 
for determining whether a number is prime or not, until a group 
of three scientists from the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) 
- Kanpur have proven that such an algorithm exists [3] no earlier 
than 2002! Before that, primality-testing was thought to be as 
hard as factoring a number, and who knows, we may end up in 
a situation where we find that P = BQP. 
As stated before, when a quantum computer factors a large 
number, it does not do so by trying all the possible prime factors 
at once. Instead, it utilizes Shor’s algorithm [4] to reduce the 
factorization problem into the period-finding problem. The 
period itself is a global property of the quantum superposition 
of the given number [1]. It is a fact about the entire waves 
created by this superposition. This reducibility gives more hope 
that a classical polynomial algorithm may exist. 
On the other hand, even if a quantum computer exists, it is 
not going to be affordable to eliminate the need for the client-
server model of computing. In fact, it will increase the necessity 
for this model as people will be in need to utilize the efficiency 
of quantum computers to solve some of their problems. As cloud 
has played a major role in flourishing IoT technology by making 
a tiny thin-client device as efficient as a super computer [5], it is 
going to play a major role in bringing the quantum computing 
power to individuals via its pay as you go pricing model. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section II illustrates the 
impact of quantum technology on cloud computing. Section III 
discusses the impact of the cloud on quantum technology. 
Finally, Section IV concludes the paper. 
 
Fig. 1. The complexity of computational problems categorized into 
different classes accordingly [2]. 
II. THE IMPACT OF QUANTUM TECHNOLOGY ON THE CLOUD 
A. Cloud Security 
Cloud is a multi-tenant environment where customers can 
share computing resources and may co-reside with hackers on 
the same host. For that, cloud security heavily relies on the 
security of the underlying Trusted Execution Environments 
(TEE) [6], e.g., Intel SGX [7], AMD Secure Processor (SP) [8], 
and ARM TrustZone (TZ) [9]. Thus, a quantum-resistant TEE 
has to be developed in order to be ready for the quantum era 
when a large-scale quantum computer becomes a reality, 
otherwise the security of the cloud will be at risk. 
The good thing is that the impact of quantum computers on 
symmetric key based algorithms, including AES (FIPS- 197), 
SHA-1/2/3 (FIPS- 180/202), HMAC (FIPS- 198) etc. is milder. 
Their search space in the face of an exhaustive key search brute 
force attack is reduced to half by virtue of the Grover algorithm 
[10]. A quick fix could be to double the key size for these 
schemes, i.e., use AES-256 instead of AES-128. Therefore, TEE 
solutions that are based on symmetric cryptography, such as the 
Intel Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions (AES-
NI) [11], are still valid to work in the quantum era. 
However, this is not the case for asymmetric cryptosystems. 
Mosca [12] has estimated that quantum technology will be able 
to break RSA-2048 with a 1/7 chance by 2026 and with a 1/2 
chance by 2031 as some sort of Moore’s law scaling is found to 
be valid for quantum computers, reaching recently a 72 qubits 
quantum chip as announced by Google [13]. This impending 
realization of a scalable quantum computers has led to active 
research in a set of new quantum-resistant cryptographic 
schemes or the Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) [14]. The 
public key cryptographic algorithms, ensuing the confidentiality 
and integrity of digital communications on the Internet and 
elsewhere today, i.e., the digital signatures standard (FIPS 186) 
and key establishment schemes (800-56A/B/C) need to be 
completely discarded and replaced with cryptographic systems 
that are secure against both quantum and classical computers, 
and can interoperate with existing communications protocols 
and networks. The National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) has initiated a public competition to invite, 
evaluate, and eventually standardize quantum-resistant public-
key cryptographic algorithms suite [15]. The 1st call of proposal 
schemes received an active response from the research 
community with 70 submissions in Nov. 2017, the 2nd round 
candidates narrowed them to 26 proposals, announced in Feb. 
2019. The finalist suite is expected around 2022-2023. The 
security, practicality, efficiency, and side channel vulnerabilities 
of these schemes on multiple implementation platforms are 
currently under active research. A successful adaptation of these 
new schemes into the current security protocols is going to be 
daunting and challenging, due to the massive number of nodes 
requiring the upgrade and the potential new vulnerabilities that 
might result. To reduce the adaptation risks of these post-
quantum schemes, the agility of the current schemes is already 
taken up by Google [16] and strongSwan [17]. 
In addition, the EU Horizon 2020 research and innovation 
programme has funded a project entitled FutureTPM to provide 
a new generation of Trusted Platform Module that are quantum-
resistant, i.e., QR-TPM [18]. QR-TPM has to adopt Quantum-
Safe Cryptography, e.g., the Lattice-based cryptography [19] 
which is one of the leading candidates for NIST PQC 
standardization [20], instead of the popular RSA and ECC 
cryptosystems. Moreover, the possibilities of using intrinsic 
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) [21] to derive keys for 
platform authentication replacing the traditional TPMs have 
been explored [22]. Furthermore, Quantum Driven PUFs [23] is 
currently under development to provides end-to-end security for 
connected devices based on unclonable quantum properties. 
On the brighter side of the post-quantum cryptography 
adaptation, is the added value in terms of advanced security 
schemes it brings along for the cloud. Some of these security 
constructs, that come with the Lattice-based cryptographic 
constructions are listed below: 
 The Fully Homomorphic encryption (FHE) or the “Holy 
Grail” of cryptography, that allows computations on 
encrypted data, hence protecting data privacy during 
communication and storage on the cloud, presented by 
Gentry in his land mark work [24] is based on Lattice-
based post-quantum cryptographic schemes. 
 Functional encryption (FE) includes identity-based 
encryption (IBE) [25], its extension hierarchical IBE 
(HIBE) [26], and attribute-based encryption (ABE) [27], 
which have shown to be practical using lattices. These 
constructs provide an alternative to large-scale public 
key infrastructures on the cloud by utilizing existing user 
information, such as user identity or characteristics to 
generate public keys. Rather than binding a user to its 
public key via a certificate, the already-established user 
property becomes its public key. This allows for sending 
of messages without prior certificate lookup, or even 
prior registration of the receiver to the public key 
database. Furthermore, it allows integration of 
timestamps to assign life cycles to keys, or encrypt 
messages with decryption possible in the future. HIBE 
eases the workload of the master key extractor through 
delegation and ABE restricts decryption capabilities to 
users with certain attributes. 
Conversely, as quantum technology is going to break several 
contemporary cryptosystems, it opens the way for new 
quantum-based security leveraging the unique properties of 
quantum physics rather than the computational hardness 
assumptions of classical cryptography. For example, quantum 
entanglement [28] can serve as an impenetrable method for 
secure transmission. Though scientists are unable to send 
information using this property as the outcomes of quantum 
measurements are quite random and if we measure an entangled 
particle in a way that forces it to be in a particular state, the 
entanglement breaks. Yet, it can still be used to generate and 
exchange a key for the one-time pad, a cryptosystem that is 
perfectly secure against all types of cryptanalysis. E91 [29] is a 
quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol based on quantum 
entanglement. Likewise, the BB84 scheme [30] is another QKD 
protocol that leverages the no-cloning theorem [31] of quantum 
mechanics. It has been tested successfully for secure key 
distribution over a 200 km quantum channel [32]. Additionally, 
the inherent randomness of quantum mechanics makes quantum 
systems a perfect source of entropy for random number 
generators which plays a key role in cryptography [33]. 
Therefore, quantum computing can be looked at as a two-
edged sword. While it breaks several asymmetric cryptosystems 
currently in use, it creates more advanced ones that are even 
harder to break. So, we do not think that quantum technology is 
going to threaten cloud security, rather it may even enhance it 
with its new bundle of quantum-based security solutions. 
B. Searching Services 
Considering a database of unsorted elements, then on 
average, half of the elements have to be checked before we can 
find the correct one. This is an O(N) complexity. In [10], Grover 
proposed a quantum-based searching algorithm that is 
quadratically faster than the classical one, i.e., O(√N). This is 
a great performance boost. For instance, if N=1,000,000, then 
the classical approach will have to check 500,000 elements on 
average, whereas the quantum one takes only 1,000 checks. 
Nevertheless, the classical binary search takes O(log N) time 
to find the correct element. This is exponentially more efficient 
than the quantum approach. However, the binary search works 
on sorted data only. Thus, the database has to be sorted before 
we can be able to run a binary search on it. The best known 
sorting algorithm is of O(N log N) complexity. This is still better 
as we are going to sort data for once and search within it forever. 
However, in the era of unstructured big data that we are living 
in today, it is challenging to guarantee that we are going to work 
only on sorted data. 
Therefore, we can imagine that cloud database servers are 
going to employ quantum-based search functionalities in the 
future to tremendously improve the search time. This can 
encourage businesses and research communities to outsource 
their data onto the cloud in order to leverage the quantum search 
services which is not usually affordable to have on premises as 
illustrated in Section III. 
C. AI Services 
AI algorithms learn by analyzing large volume of cases one 
by one looking for patterns. However, scientists claim that 
quantum superpositions could escalate the learning process by 
interfering with each other and avoid looking at each case 
individually [34]. In fact, quantum computing has already 
proved itself in the AI field. The D-Wave systems [35], which 
is not a universal quantum computer, rather it is a quantum 
annealer famous for finding the global minimum of a given 
function over a given set of solutions [36], has proven its 
efficiency in its problem domain. Google announced that D-
Wave is 100 million times faster than the classical simulated 
annealing running on a single core processor [37]. Even when 
Google ran the test using Quantum Monte Carlo [38], an 
approach that simulates running quantum problems on classical 
processors, it found that the D-Wave quantum annealer was still 
100 million times faster [37]. 
Quantum annealer has already been involved in several areas 
requiring optimization, simulation, and machine learning 
services. It has been used in: NASA space research [39], 
medical science for optimal radiation therapy [40], material 
simulation [41], the financial sector [42], traffic flow 
optimization [43], and even intrusion detection [44]. Therefore, 
besides other cloud-based innovative AI solutions, quantum 
annealing is expected to be the 1st quantum service to be offered 
on public clouds. 
III. THE IMPACT OF THE CLOUD ON QUANTUM TECHNOLOGY 
A. Reachability 
Quantum technology is expensive. In fact, once a quantum 
computer comes into reality, it is expected to be costlier than a 
super computer. Today, D-Wave offers its 2000Q quantum 
annealer by $15 million [45]. Conversely, IBM offers its 50-
qubits universal quantum chip by $15 million as well [46]. 
According to [47], the average SMB spending on IT is 6.4% of 
its annual revenue. Whereas, the average revenue of small 
businesses is not expected to exceed $50 million ending up with 
a maximum of $3.2 million for the total IT spending on 
software, communication, and infrastructure. Obviously, it is far 
away from what a quantum computer may cost. 
Conversely, quantum technology requires very specific 
working conditions to activate the quantum state. For instance, 
the D-Wave 2X processor operates at 15 Milli-Kelvin 
temperature ≈ -273 Celsius [48]. This means, current quantum 
technology is not going to be handy and physically affordable to 
individuals as the traditional classical computing today which 
can operate at 67 Celsius. Therefore, the only option for 
quantum technology to reach SMBs and individuals is the cloud 
computing pay as you go service offering model. 
Indeed, IBM has already made its 5-qubit and 16-qubit 
quantum processors accessible via its online platform, IBM Q 
Experience [49]. Likewise, Google has launched its online 
Quantum Computing Playground that can simulate up to 22 
qubits quantum registers as of today [50]. Moreover, D-Wave 
has made its real-time QPU accessible over its online platform, 
Leap [51], with only 1 minute of QPU time free per month. 
B. Efficient Utilization 
Despite its powerful computational capabilities, quantum 
technology has specific application areas. In that, it is not going 
to replace the deterministic classical computing model. Instead, 
they are going to work aside. Large businesses, even if they can 
afford to pay the cost of a quantum computer, are not going to 
fully rely on it. It is expected that the majority of the time, 
quantum computer will stay idle. Thus, the cloud multi-tenant 
environment is the only way to increase the efficient utilization 
of the quantum computing power. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This paper discusses, for the first time, the potential impact 
of quantum technology on cloud computing and vice versa. It 
has been shown that both technologies are going to complement 
each other. The power of quantum computing is going to 
enhance the computing capabilities of the cloud and allow it to 
offer more efficient computing services. Whereas, the cloud is 
going to fully unleash quantum technology by bringing it to 
individuals and make it more affordable to SMEs. 
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